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FOREWORD
Today, U.S. and European defense ﬁrms are at a crossroads.
Opportunities for the construction of a transatlantic defense sector
are tangible, but signiﬁcant obstacles may accelerate the formation
of a bipolar industrial base. While market forces played a key role in
the transformation and consolidation of these sectors in recent years,
political considerations are largely responsible for a restructuring
process that has been almost entirely among U.S. ﬁrms in the United
States and among European Union companies in Europe.
In this monograph, Dr. Terrence Guay examines the forces that
have shaped the restructuring of the U.S. and European defense
industries since the end of the Cold War, and presents factors that will
inﬂuence further restructuring and consolidation in the short- and
medium- terms. He contends that a transatlantic defense industrial
base is preferable to a bipolar one, and recommends that the U.S.
Government open its defense equipment market to more European
ﬁrms, and that European governments reciprocate. Additionally,
military forces should put greater effort into coordinating procurement requirements and needs, and ﬁrms should explore expanding
transatlantic links.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this work as
part of our External Research Associates Program.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph compares the post-Cold War restructuring
of the defense industries in the United States and Europe with
the aim of understanding the implications for the transatlantic
industrial base. We argue that different processes of industrial
restructuring and consolidation present obstacles to transatlantic
initiatives, and that government policies and conﬂicting political
visions exacerbate the opportunities for collaboration between
the United States and Europe. We assess the extent to which the
restructuring of the U.S. and European defense industrial bases has
uprooted national champions and, assisted by global competition,
provided an industrial foundation for more extensive transatlantic
cooperation. We conclude by suggesting factors that will shape
further restructuring and consolidation in the short- and mediumterm, and making recommendations for assisting the development
of a transatlantic, rather than bipolar, defense industrial base.
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THE TRANSATLANTIC DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE:
RESTRUCTURING SCENARIOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
This monograph compares the post-Cold War restructuring of
the defense industries in the United States and Europe with several
objectives in mind. First, it is important to examine the process of
restructuring and consolidation on both sides of the Atlantic, and
the different forms that this industry has taken. This will provide
some sense of the strategic visions of the private and public
sectors, and the opportunities for partnerships at the corporate
and military procurement levels. Second, it is necessary to learn
what roles private sector and public ofﬁcials have played in the
restructuring process, and the extent to which U.S. and European
political, industrial, and military leaders have collaborated in this
restructuring process through formal channels such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU),
or bilateral relations, and informal channels. This will help us to
understand the extent to which U.S. and European defense industry
restructuring have been independent or mutual processes. Third, it
is essential to describe the obstacles that make the armaments market
signiﬁcantly different than other markets for goods and services.
Such political and economic obstacles in Europe and the United
States go a long way toward explaining why a truly transatlantic
defense industrial base has been so difﬁcult to create. The present
“bipolar defense industrial base,” and the lack of political will to
change this, is responsible for much of the “capability gap” among
NATO members. Finally, the monograph will conclude by assessing
the extent to which the restructuring of the U.S. and European
defense industrial bases has uprooted national champions and,
assisted by global competition, provided an industrial foundation for
more extensive transatlantic cooperation. It will also suggest likely
scenarios for further restructuring and consolidation, particularly
along the transatlantic dimension, in the short-term (0-3 years) and
medium-term (4-10 years), and make recommendations for assisting
the development of a transatlantic, rather than bipolar, defense
industrial base.
1

POST-COLD WAR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS
The end of the Cold War forced defense ﬁrms around the globe
to adapt to a dramatically different operating environment. With
defense spending plummeting in almost every country, defense
companies had few options. They could merge with or acquire other
ﬁrms in the hope that economies of scale and scope would ensure
their survival; ﬁnd or develop new export markets; diversify into
other sectors that depend less on government defense contracts; or go
out of business, in effect, by selling themselves to the highest bidder.
U.S. and European defense ﬁrms pursued each of these strategies,
but the timing, pace, and industrial structure varied considerably.
United States.
Historically, the engine of growth for the U.S. defense industry
was strong domestic demand, fueled by the Cold War. Times were
especially prosperous for the industry from the late 1970s through
the late 1980s. By the early 1990s, however, the tide had turned. As
the defense budget was slashed in search of a “peace dividend,” the
U.S. defense industry realized that the golden years of President
Ronald Reagan’s buildup were over. Military spending declined
from $422 billion in 1989 to $290 billion in 1999 (in constant 2000
dollars), with the steepest decline coming in the mid-1990s.1 Prodded
in 1993 by then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the industry hastened
to adjust.2 Layoffs by ﬁrms such as Northrop, Hughes, Lockheed,
General Dynamics, Litton Industries, and TRW marked a spate
of “downsizings” and acquisitions, culminating in the mergers of
Lockheed and Martin Marietta, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, and
Raytheon and Hughes. A 2003 Pentagon report found that the 50
largest defense suppliers of the early 1980s have become today’s top
ﬁve contractors.3
U.S. ﬁrms now dominate the global defense industry: six of the
top ten defense companies in the world are based in the United
States, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman,
Raytheon, General Dynamics, and United Technologies (see Table 1).
The U.S. defense industry―or at least the aerospace and electronics
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components of it―consolidated quickly, but with the strong urging
of the Pentagon. Most of the mergers occurred between 1993-98.
Since the late 1990s, major defense contractors have pursued three
strategies: buying relatively small defense units from diversiﬁed
U.S. conglomerates (like General Motors and TRW); acquiring
defense-related businesses outside of aerospace and electronics
(such as information technology or shipbuilding); or expanding
abroad by buying foreign defense ﬁrms. The ﬁrst strategy has been
just about exhausted. The second strategy is likely to continue to be
popular, especially in a post-9/11 world where the U.S. Government
is spending considerable sums on Homeland Security, intelligence,
and surveillance. The third strategy is the most difﬁcult to predict or
pursue, especially since most of the smaller European defense ﬁrms
now have been acquired by larger European or U.S. companies. The
next step for U.S. ﬁrms would be to acquire or merge with large
European companies―a much more signiﬁcant development than
the ad hoc alliances and collaborations that often arise with large
multination weapons systems. But, as will be made clear below, the
obstacles to this strategy are formidable.
U.S.
RANK

WORLD
RANK

COMPANY

DEFENSE
REVENUE1

TOTAL
REVENUE1

1

1

Lockheed Martin

$30,097

$31,824

95

2

2

Boeing

27,360

50,500

54

3

3

Northrop Grumman

18,700

26,200

71

4

5

Raytheon

16,896

18,100

93

FROM
DEFENSE

5

6

General Dynamics

12,782

16,617

77

6

10

United Technologies2

5,300

31,034

17

7

11

L-3 Communications

4,369

5,062

86

8

12

Honeywell

4,200

23,100

18

9

13

Computer Sciences
Corp.3

3,818

14,800

26

10

14

Science Applications4

3,735

6,720

56

Figures are in US$ million.
U.S. Government sales only.
3
For ﬁscal year ending 3/31.
4
For ﬁscal year ending 1/31.
Source: Figures derived from Defense News Top 100 (http://www.defensenews.com/content/features/
2004chart1.html).
1
2

Table 1. Top Ten U.S. Defense Companies (2004).
3

Europe.
Europe’s defense industry began the 1990s as a collection of
national defense ﬁefdoms. While the U.S. defense industry was rapidly
consolidating during the ﬁrst half of the decade, most European
ﬁrms continued to look inward. European consolidation at this time
took the form of large national defense champions acquiring small
domestic ﬁrms (a strategy pursued by Germany’s Daimler-Benz),
or big companies acquiring targets in countries with minor defense
industries (e.g., France’s Thomson-CSF purchasing the defense
electronics business of Dutch Philips). Transnational collaborations
that did exist generally took the form of joint ventures (for products
like missiles) or multinational consortia (like the Euroﬁghter)―
both of which enabled defense ﬁrms to maintain their national
independence. Large-scale cross-border mergers were hindered by
the reluctance to see a domestic company acquired by a foreign ﬁrm.
This concern was most evident in the political realm, as national
governments worried about the loss of sovereignty (particularly
the insecurity that armaments may not be readily available) and
the political consequences of restructuring-induced job losses that
might accompany such an acquisition. France’s dirigism was (and
remains) the most recognizable form of government involvement
in the defense sector, but all European countries employed similar
policies to some degree. However, defense ﬁrms resisted industrywide rationalization almost as much. Many executives feared the
uncertainty that would follow mergers with respect to the cozy
relationships they had cultivated through the years with their
“home” defense ministry. The extent to which these links would be
weakened by Europe-wide industrial restructuring was unclear. The
status quo was the safest option for both government and business.
By the late 1990s, this situation became untenable. Given the
consolidation in the United States and the political impetus for a
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) within the European
Union (EU), European defense ﬁrms found themselves under
political and economic pressure to consolidate. The ﬁrst major
consolidation occurred in the United Kingdom (UK) in January 1999,
when General Electric Company (GEC) agreed to sell its defense
arm (Marconi Electronic Systems) to British Aerospace. The new
4

entity was renamed BAE Systems. Nine months later, a European
defense giant was born. The ﬁrst step, as in the UK, was national
consolidation. As part of its privatization in June 1999, France’s
Aérospatiale joined with Matra to create an aerospace and defense
electronics powerhouse. Four months later, this combined entity
merged with Dasa to form European Aeronautic Defence and Space
Company (EADS). Construcciones Aeronauticas Sociedad Anomina
(CASA), Spain’s leading aerospace and defense ﬁrm, also merged
into EADS.
Similar consolidation occurred in related sectors. In October
1997, the French government announced that it would privatize
Thomson-CSF, and bring Dassault Electronique, the space and
defense electronics businesses of Alcatel, and the satellite businesses
of Aérospatiale within the company. Thomson-CSF acquired Racal
Electronics of the UK in June 2000 and was renamed Thales. Two
companies now account for Europe’s helicopter business: Eurocopter
(a division of EADS) and AgustaWestland (which combined the
helicopter interests within Italy and the UK). MBDA, the world’s
second-largest maker of missiles (behind Raytheon), was formed in
2003 by merging the missile interests of EADS, BAE Systems, and
Finmeccanica.
Table 2 shows that BAE Systems dominates Europe’s defense
industry, while Thales and EADS each have roughly half the defense
revenues of BAE Systems. As described above, the paths of these
mergers appear to represent two different strategies of consolidation.
BAE Systems is the result of the consolidation of much of the UK’s
national defense infrastructure into one company, without any
major cross-border ties. EADS, on the other hand, was formed via
a “merger of mergers,” thereby producing a company that would
be in a stronger position to negotiate transnational ventures. It is
signiﬁcant that the momentum to create EADS was driven not so
much by national leaders, but by corporate executives who made a
conscious and calculated decision to keep their respective national
leaders uninformed of the plans, until the advanced stage of the
negotiation.4 By such unusual discretion, political meddling in what
was essentially a business decision was kept to a minimum.
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EU
BANK

WORLD
BANK

COMPANY

COUNRTY

2003
DEFENSE
REVENUE 1

2003
TOTAL
REVENUE 1

% OF
REVENUE
FROM
DEFENSE

1

4

BAE Systems2

2

UK

$17,159

$22,359

77

7

Thales

France

8,476

13,310

64

3

8

EADS

Multiple

8,037

37,797

21

4

9

Finmeccanica

Italy

5,896

10,857

54

5

18

Rolls Royce

UK

2,490

9,960

25

6

20

DCN

France

2,085

2,085

100

7

22

Rheinmetall

Germany

2,014

5,334

38

8

23

Dassault Aviation

France

2,009

4,144

49

9

24

Snecma

France

1,846

8,037

23

10

26

Smiths Industries

UK

1,778

4,235

42

3
4

5

Figures are in US$ million. Currency conversions calculated using prevailing rates at the end of
each ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year.
2
Does not include 2004 Alvis acquisition.
3
EADS is 30.2 percent owned by DaimlerChrysler (Germany), 30.2 percent by SOGEADE (a French
holding company comprised of Lagardère and the French state), and 5.5 percent by SEPI (Spanish
state holding company). Approximately 34 percent of EADS shares are held by the public. EADS is
registered in the Netherlands.
4
Purchase of AugustaWestland shares from GKN pending.
5
Fiscal year ending 7/31.
Source: Figures derived from Defense News Top 100 (http://www.defensenews.com/content/features/
2004chart1.html).
1

Table 2. Top Ten European Union Defense Companies (2004).
BAE Systems, which may at ﬁrst glance look like a “national
champion,” instead may be a test case of a new breed of ﬁrm: a
genuine transatlantic defense company. One reason British Aerospace
opted to merge with GEC rather than Dasa was to own Tracor,
GEC’s largest subsidiary in the United States. As discussed below,
merger talks between BAE Systems and U.S. ﬁrms have intensiﬁed
in recent months. British ﬁrms have long enjoyed preferential access
to U.S. ﬁrms and technology. Such access is critical today, as U.S.
ofﬁcials after September 11, 2001, are even more anxious about the
possibility of sophisticated technology falling into enemy hands by
way of European defense contractors. The British are trusted with
technology, and are allowed to buy into the U.S. market, in a way
that the French and Germans are not.5
6

In the case of both EADS and BAE Systems, the Europeans have
formed defense titans that can ﬁnally match their U.S. counterparts.
With the notable exception of shipbuilders, land vehicles producers,
and aircraft engine makers, there is little left to consolidate within
Europe. Directions des Constructions Navales (DCN), the French
shipmaker, is likely to be controlled by the state for some time.
However, Noelle Lenoir, France’s European minister, suggests that
the project of creating a pan-European shipbuilder along the lines
of EADS is important to the French and German governments.6 But
U.S. and European ﬁrms so dominate the global armaments market
that few opportunities remain for nonorganic revenue growth.
The global trend is toward consolidation among national defense
ﬁrms or developing strategic alliances with U.S. or European
companies. In 1990, the world’s 10 largest defense companies
comprised just 37 percent of global weapons sales. By 2000, the
world’s 10 largest defense ﬁrms were responsible for 58 percent of
international arms sales.7 Signiﬁcant steps have been taken toward
cross-border rationalization only within the European region. Much
of this can be explained by the wider economic restructuring that
Europe has experienced over the past 20 years.8 The EU’s Single
European Act (SEA) was a driving force in the efforts to make
European ﬁrms more competitive at the global level, and the results
spilled over into the defense sector. But economics can only go so far
in shaping an industry whose foundation is ultimately political.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
While the economic environment may be ripe for transatlantic
opportunities, political considerations pose formidable obstacles in
both the United States and Europe.
United States.
As indicated in Table 3, U.S. defense spending dipped by more
than 31 percent between 1989 and 1999. However, in just 4 years,
spending has returned to 1989 levels. Today, the Pentagon accounts
for almost half of global defense spending.9 This ﬁgure may increase
if budgetary projections hold up. Congress approved a $416 billion
7

ﬁscal 2005 defense funding measure, which contained a record $70
billion for research and development (R&D)―20 percent above
the peak levels of President Reagan’s historic defense buildup in
the 1980s.10 Tens of billions more out of $78 billion allocated for
procurement will go for big-ticket weapons systems. Financing the
activities of U.S. troops in Iraq and force modernization are expected
to push defense spending to nearly $500 billion in 2005, above the
inﬂation-adjusted Cold War average, and $50 billion above 2004.
The Congressional Budget Ofﬁce estimates that the long-term price
tag for all the planes, ships, and weapons the military services want
will be at least $770 billion above what the Bush administration’s
long-term defense plan calls for.
COUNTRY

1989

1994

% CHANGE
FROM 1989

1999

% CHANGE
FROM 1989

2003

% CHANGE
FROM 1989

United
States

$422,133

$334,539

-20.8%

$290,480

-31.2%

$417,363

-1.1%

EU-15

180,319

159,176

-11.7%

153,561

-14.8%

154,909

-14.1%

France

38,807

37,438

-3.5%

34,209

-11.8%

35,030

-9.7%

Germany

38,128

30,214

-20.8%

28,744

-24.6%

27,169

-28.7%

United
Kingdom

46,746

40,268

-13.9%

35,171

-24.8%

37,137

-20.6%

European
“Big Three”
Total

123,681

107,920

-12.7%

98,124

-20.7%

99,336

-19.7%

Note: Figures are in U.S.$ million, at constant 2000 prices, and exchange rates are for calendar year.
Source: Figures derived from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
http://ﬁrst.sipri.org/non_ﬁrst/result_milex.php.

Table 3. Defense Spending―United States and Europe.
Industrial consolidation within the United States is virtually
complete. The ﬁve largest defense ﬁrms so dominate Pentagon
procurement that further consolidation among them would weaken
the competitive bidding process to an unacceptable level. Some
critics argue that consolidation has already gone too far and has
eliminated the virtues of competition. The logical next step would
be to include more non-U.S. ﬁrms in the procurement process and
to permit transatlantic mergers. Yet, the obstacles are signiﬁcant.
8

Ron Sugar, chairman and chief executive of Northrop Grumman,
probably reﬂects the view of many government, military, and industry
ofﬁcials when he says, “We’re not just making toothpaste, we’re in
the business of national security. National borders do matter.”11
Had U.S. defense industry consolidation been pursued to its
logical conclusion, Northrop Grumman would have been acquired by
Lockheed Martin or Boeing. In fact, Lockheed Martin and Northrop
Grumman agreed to a merger in 1997, and it was widely assumed
that the U.S. Government would approve, it being the last logical
step in the Defense Department’s goal of industry consolidation.
With one acquisition following another, however, both the Defense
and Justice departments had become increasingly worried about
the lack of competition in the defense marketplace.12 In 1998, the
U.S. Government announced that it would oppose the merger on
the grounds that consolidation was beginning to compromise
competition in the contracting process. However, this conclusion
was based almost entirely on an understanding of the defense sector
as a national market. Certainly, plenty of capable non-American
suppliers existed, particularly in Europe. But the political obstacles
to viewing military contractors from a global or even transatlantic
perspective are daunting.
How one deﬁnes the size of the market is critically important. While
leery of more domestic mergers, some ofﬁcials (in both government
and industry) have been quietly ﬂoating the idea of an Atlantic
partnership.13 Such an Atlantic merger would need to be supported
by the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon, and would have to
ensure the safety of key U.S. technologies. Nevertheless, by expanding
the geography of the market, the number of possible competitors is
also simultaneously expanded, allowing ﬁrms to wring more savings
out of consolidation while still allowing the beneﬁts of competition.
BAE Systems is a prime candidate for an intercontinental merger,
although Northrop Grumman is also known to be on the menu of
some European ﬁrms. BAE Systems, moreover, already has put in
place many of the safeguards U.S. ofﬁcials would require when
it assumed Tracor as part of GEC’s defense business, and when it
acquired Lockheed Martin’s aerospace electronics systems business
in 2000.

9

The environment for consolidating a transatlantic defense
industrial base is currently being poisoned by some U.S. politicians
who seem to be going out of their way to antagonize European
countries and their defense ﬁrms. Part of this stems from a decadesold interest in protecting weapons manufacturing jobs in the United
States, while a more recent justiﬁcation is to punish European ﬁrms
for not supporting the Iraq War. In September 2003, the U.S. House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee drafted a controversial
bill barring the Pentagon from using overseas suppliers in purchasing
parts for essential weapons systems. Additionally, the U.S. content
requirement for Pentagon purchases would increase from 50 to 65
percent.
The bill provoked a storm of protests from numerous corners.14
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld opposed the measure on the
grounds that it would reduce the Pentagon’s supplier base and cost
the Defense Department and its U.S. contractors billions of dollars to
replace foreign-made machine tools. Senate Armed Services chairman
John Warner also was opposed, fearing it would lead to retaliation by
other countries and jeopardize America’s approximately $50 billion
annual trade surplus in aerospace products. U.S. defense ﬁrms and
trade groups, including the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA),
resisted the bill on the grounds that it would wreak havoc by barring
foreign subcontractors in product supply chains and hamper foreign
sales by U.S. defense ﬁrms. In a letter sent to Senator Warner by the
AIA and the European Association of Aerospace Industries, the
trade groups said such a provision “would undermine cross-Atlantic
defense industry relationships.”15 Compliance costs, certifying that
U.S. defense contractors did not use foreign parts, also would be
burdensome.
The European Commission warned Congress that adoption of
legislation urging the Pentagon to buy all essential weapons parts
from U.S. manufacturers could spark a new transatlantic trade
dispute.16 The Commission threatened to take their case to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) if the ﬁnal bill contained provisions
contrary to WTO rules. A requirement to purchase only U.S.made machine tools, for example, would likely violate WTO rules
governing government procurement. Under current laws, 50 percent
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of a U.S. weapons system must be American-made.17 The Pentagon
fought attempts in 2003 to make the laws more stringent, arguing
that would anger allies and increase the cost of some programs. Just
4.1 percent, or $8.6 billion, of the $209 billion that the Pentagon spent
on procurement in ﬁscal 2003 went to foreign entities.
Given the fragile state of U.S.-Europe economic relations, which
have been strained in recent years by disputes over geneticallymodiﬁed organisms, steel, merger approvals, and aid to Airbus and
Boeing, another high-proﬁle trade controversy would not be helpful
for transatlantic relations. In the end, Congress kept a Buy America
provision in the defense bill, but it does not require the Pentagon to
favor U.S. manufacturers.18 It now only directs the Pentagon to assess
the ability of U.S. manufacturers to produce military systems and
creates a fund to support them. It also creates an incentive program
to encourage defense contractors to use U.S. machine tools.
In the post 9/11 “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) era, the
Pentagon is shifting its spending priorities in ways that probably will
not help European defense ﬁrms. With an emphasis on information
technology, intelligence, surveillance, communications, and related
technologies requiring high levels of security, foreign ﬁrms―even
European ones―are at a competitive disadvantage for Pentagon
contracts, even at the subcontractor level. Some defense ﬁrms are
making the necessary changes to ﬁll the needs for anti-terrorism and
homeland security.19 Northrop Grumman expects sales to the U.S.
Government related to homeland security of at least $500 million. The
U.S. Department of Homeland Security has a faster growing budget
than the military defense budget, with investments expected to grow
more than 10 percent each year until 2009. But most European ﬁrms
will not be trusted to supply these needs.
Some Pentagon and military ofﬁcials are more interested in
including European defense ﬁrms in the procurement process than
Congress or U.S. defense companies. In June 2004, then Air Force
Secretary James Roche warned that consolidation among U.S.
contractors had left the Pentagon overdependent on a small number
of key suppliers in certain sectors.20 He said the main way to correct
this is to encourage overseas manufacturers to compete for Defense
Department spending. He even has encouraged EADS to compete
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if a controversial Air Force tanker refueling contract (originally
awarded to Boeing, but rescinded after an ethics scandal) is reopened,
especially after the European ﬁrm’s victories over Boeing in tanker
competitions in the UK and Australia. EADS has suggested that the
company would consider opening production lines in the United
States, particularly if it were allowed to compete for major U.S.
defense contracts.21 But until there is evidence of this in Washington,
production facilities will remain within their respective borders.
Europe.
As mentioned above, only the United States among the major
transatlantic powers has returned to Cold War levels of defense
spending. While most European countries cut their defense spending
by a smaller percentage than the United States between 1989 and
1999, few have increased spending by any signiﬁcant amount in
response to recent terrorist threats (see Table 3). Germany and the UK
account for a disproportionate amount of spending cuts in Europe.
In the UK, the defense industry lost about 160,000 jobs between 1990
and 1998, when it employed just 260,000. The drop in Sweden went
from 22,782 workers in 1990 to just 14,810 in 2002. The French sector
had 250,100 workers in 1990, but 84,100 fewer in 2000. However, in
the United States, approximately 3 million people were employed in
arms production in 2003―just 115,000 less than 1990.22
The EU continues to move toward a common defense policy,
although the signiﬁcance and tangibility of agreements varies
considerably. An analysis of the European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) requires far more space than is available in this monograph.23
Sufﬁce it to say that progress toward an ESDP of any meaning will
inﬂuence trans-European defense industry consolidation positively,
but may not be helpful for NATO. We highlight here those aspects
of ESDP that have the potential for signiﬁcant impact on this sector.
Cooperation in weapons procurement will be a key test for
the successful fusion of ESDP and defense industry consolidation.
In September 1998, France, the UK, Germany, and Italy signed an
agreement giving a legal identity to the Joint European Armaments
Organizations (commonly known by its French acronym―OCCAR).
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OCCAR’s largest managed project to date is Europe’s ﬁrst indigenous
antiballistic missile defense system. The €3 billion tri-nation
production program was awarded funding by OCCAR in November
2003. In October 2003, EU defense ministers backed ambitious plans
to have their armed forces capable of working together by 2010.24
The plans were a response to EU Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) Secretary General Javier Solana’s long-standing view
that the EU needs improved security and defense capabilities. For
the EU to have armed forces that are agile, ﬂexible, deployable, and
sustainable, member states would need to combine forces and focus
on quality and increasing military spending.
In June 2004, EU foreign ministers approved the creation of the
European Defense Agency (EDA), designed to improve Europe’s
military capabilities and support its security and defense policies.
The aim of the EDA is to help member states improve cooperation
on R&D, develop defense capabilities, foster armaments cooperation,
and coordinate Europe-wide purchasing and contracting of
weapons systems. Its small ﬁrst year budget of €2 million will rise
to €25 million in 2005. Although the agency budget will require
unanimity, Secretary General Solana managed to secure agreement
from ministers that as many decisions as possible will be taken by
majority voting.25 As in most of the EU’s defense-related initiatives,
Britain and France played instrumental roles in establishing the
EDA. For France, the EDA is a platform to create a European defense
manufacturing base, supported by more spending on R&D and with
contract preferences for European ﬁrms. In a sense, the EDA transfers
France’s statist approach to business-government relations to the EU
level. For Britain, the EDA is a forum less for industrial policy than
for improving the military capabilities of member states―an objective
shared by NATO. Unfortunately, this divergence in views may not
be healthy for the EDA’s long-term viability.
While BAE Systems, EADS, and Thales have supported the
creation of such an agency, arguing that only through consolidating
spending and research budgets can EU countries compete with an
ever-rising U.S. defense budget, their chief executives issued a joint
statement warning that the agency risks becoming “a ﬁg leaf to cover
the nakedness of any real efforts to improve European defence”
unless it is given real power from the outset.26 The ﬁrms would like
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the EDA to identify holes in military capabilities and push member
states to increase funding to ﬁll the shortfalls. In addition, they want
the EDA to have a modest budget to coordinate research spending,
and to have the authority to break down internal barriers to the
defense trade. More controversially, they also call on the EDA to
help protect Europe’s defense industrial base. While not advocating
a “Fortress Europe,” they also do not want “indigenous defence
technology overtaken or dependence on foreign technologies [to]
become a necessity, especially where technology transfer terms are
very restrictive”―a clear reference to U.S. export regimes. Still, many
European executives understand the beneﬁts of gaining access to
U.S. defense technologies. In November 2003, Philippe Camus, joint
chief executive of EADS, called on European governments to step up
R&D in advanced technologies by pressing forward with a European
defense procurement and research agency, and to foster greater
transatlantic cooperation in the defense industry.27 He also said
that both the European and North American industry associations
were now united in encouraging their governments to open up
“the playing ﬁeld for cooperation and competition,” adding that
transatlantic allies should foster an environment in which industrial
partners can focus on delivering the most advanced systems in the
most cost-efﬁcient manner. This is particularly important to Camus,
since a consequence of the wave of consolidations and mergers in
the late 1990s is that now fewer players of true global scale exist,
thereby making it more important to promote industrial cooperation
and strategic partnerships for competition to be maintained and for
innovation to push the sector forward.
While the EU does not have any equivalent to the proposed
“Buy America” defense procurement rules, member states have
kept weapons procurement and other purchases related to the
production of war material outside of the EU’s open procurement
rules governing virtually every other area of national government
purchases. The UK and France, which are home to the bulk of
Europe’s defense industrial base, traditionally have been the most
adamant that these are national issues, although France’s recent
initiatives in this area (e.g., ESDP, EDA, and OCCAR) appear to be
attempts to mold the EU in France’s image. The EU’s competition
and trade policies also have been circumscribed to some extent when
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applied to the defense sector (e.g., dual-use goods). On the political
side, member countries have pledged themselves to creating a rapid
reaction force that could deploy troops for humanitarian or crisis
intervention. Such initiatives have inﬂuenced national government
procurement decisions, particularly the interest in developing cargo
and troop transport capacities.
European governments are showing a growing inclination to
procure from European companies, which is upsetting some U.S.
defense ﬁrms that often could rely on steady sales to U.S. allies.
Airbus’s military subsidiary beat Boeing and Lockheed Martin to win
a €20 billion contract to supply seven European countries with 180
new military transport aircraft―the A400M.28 But the most important
test came in January 2004, when the UK Ministry of Defence opted
to spend $23 billion on refueling aircraft from EADS.29 The 27-year
contract was a major blow to Boeing, which has a near monopoly on
tanker aircraft, and to BAE Systems, which had teamed up with the
U.S. ﬁrm in the expectation that they would win the competition.
The EADS-headed consortium included Rolls-Royce, which will
manufacture the tankers’ engines, and Thales, which will produce
much of the avionics in factories in Britain. Losing the UK contract
effectively would have shut Airbus and EADS out of the tanker
market. While the actual factors determining the outcome of the
decision may never be known, it is likely that national industrial
issues played a major role. The Airbus-led team, AirTanker,
emphasized that its A330s are partly built in the UK and half of all
new planes and 90 percent of conversions of the old aircraft used for
their bid will be built in the UK. AirTanker claimed that 7,500 jobs
would be added or sustained if their bid was picked, while Boeing’s
team could claim just 5,000. In another example, the British Ministry
of Defence in 2003 selected Thales, instead of BAE Systems, to design
a new aircraft carrier. Perhaps as a consequence, France and Britain
agreed in June 2004 to cooperate in building their next generation
aircraft carriers.30
As has been their practice since the SEA, the European Parliament
and especially the European Commission have tried harder than the
Council to develop a European industrial base.31 In its most recent
statement on the subject, the Commission argues that, “Strengthening
the industrial and market situation of European defence companies
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will greatly improve the EU’s ability to fulﬁll the Petersberg tasks in
the accomplishment of ESDP. It will also beneﬁt collective defence
by strengthening Europe’s contribution to NATO.”32 To achieve this
goal, the Commission proposed action in the areas of standardization;
monitoring of defense related industries; intracommunity transfers;
competition policy; harmonized procurement rules; closer cooperation on the export control of dual-use goods; and R&D.
At the political level, then, European governments have a mixed
record. On the one hand, they seem more willing to see Europe’s
defense industry strengthen vis-à-vis U.S. ﬁrms, but they are less
committed to institutionalizing these goals within the EU, OCCAR,
or NATO. It is too early to say whether EDA will have a signiﬁcant
impact on Europe’s industrial base, but prior EU attempts in this
area have been disappointing.
TRANSATLANTIC OR BIPOLAR?
Both political and economic factors will determine the direction
of transatlantic collaboration in the defense sector. The level and
form of defense spending is one of the most critical factors (see
Table 3). While the Bush administration increased U.S. defense
spending to among the highest amounts since the end of World War
II (although not nearly as high when measured as a percentage of
gross domestic product), it is not clear that this amount of spending
can continue. Gradually rising interest rates, large federal budget
deﬁcits, and, perhaps most importantly, a shift in public opinion
away from spending on defense may push Washington to reduce
military spending. Meanwhile, Europe has slashed defense spending
since 1989, and has done little to increase it since 9/11 or the Iraq
War. Advocates of ESDP, as well as U.S. ofﬁcials, have called on
European governments to increase defense spending for several
years. An increase in spending would serve to strengthen Europe’s
defense industry, assuming the additional funds were allocated
toward equipment purchases and wisely spent by OCCAR and
EDA. European ﬁrms would then be in a better position to negotiate
with U.S. ﬁrms, should they opt for enhanced transatlantic ties.
Alternatively, they might ﬁnd it more attractive to focus on Europe,
especially if EDA gives preferences to European ﬁrms.
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One indication that Europe may be opting for the bipolar path
is the political capital expended on the Galileo project―a joint
undertaking by the EU and the European Space Agency.33 Galileo,
Europe’s alternative to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS),
was given the go-ahead in May 2003 by European governments
who agreed to fund the €3.6 billion project. The target is to have
27 satellites fully operational by 2008. Galileo is not a solely
European project, as China has agreed to invest €230 million in the
collaboration, and India and Israel, among other countries, are also
lobbying to participate. Such countries are barred from collaboration
on GPS since it is largely a military system run by the Pentagon.
While it certainly has technological merits and provides economic
beneﬁts, Galileo’s foundation lies in the politics of the EU and
ESDP. The EU views Galileo as a move away from dependence on
the Pentagon’s GPS, and a step towards a common defense. It is
telling that non-European countries have been included in, or may
yet join, Galileo. Their involvement reduces funding requirements
from European defense budgets. The U.S. GPS system is closed to
outsiders for security reasons. The perception that the U.S. stresses
security concerns over economics in its arms production, whereas
the Europeans are struggling to ﬁnance core military capabilities,
contains a good deal of credence in the case of satellite navigation.
Outright transatlantic mergers may be difﬁcult to pull off, but
more traditional collaborations on large weapons systems are still
viable. While it has been long common for companies to team up
when submitting bids, especially as a means to gain access to a market
that for political reasons would otherwise be closed, transatlantic
alliances contain their own set of problems. The most serious is
technology transfer. The Pentagon does not trust many non-U.S.
defense ﬁrms with state-of-the-art technologies, fearing that such
know-how may end up in the hands of enemies. Another problem
with such collaborations is the demand by governments participating
in such projects that companies in their countries should get a certain
proportion of the associated work. For example, Norway, one of
eight countries partnering on the $244 billion F-35 ﬁghter jet project,
has threatened to pull out if project manager Lockheed Martin does
not help Norway’s local industries secure work on the aircraft.34 By
contributing funds for developing the plane in its early stages, the
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expectation of participating countries like Norway is that they will
gain access to technology and production.
Blame for letting political tensions spill over into defense
industrial matters does not rest entirely with the United States. The
EU is considering ending its arms embargo on China. Imposed after
the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, France and Germany, among
others, would like to see arms sales to the world’s largest weapons
importing country resumed. However, in May 2004. the U.S. House
of Representatives Armed Services Committee approved legislation
that would impose new export restrictions on sales of U.S. defense
and sensitive technologies to any country selling arms to China.35
In addition, the committee adopted an amendment that would bar
the Pentagon for 5 years from doing any business with a company
that sells arms to China, a prohibitive penalty for European defense
ﬁrms.
U.S. administration ofﬁcials ﬁnd themselves in a difﬁcult
situation.36 An easing of restrictions on the sales of military
equipment to close U.S. allies would enhance the interoperability of
U.S., NATO, and other allied forces―a goal that U.S. ofﬁcials have
set since discovering the weaknesses of European forces during the
1991 Gulf War. On the other hand, the United States is sensitive
to the security concerns of Taiwan and other East Asian countries,
and opposes any initiative that would strengthen China’s military
capabilities signiﬁcantly. House Republicans in particular are
putting pressure on the administration’s efforts to ease controls on
sales of military goods to Europe, and any weakening of European
restrictions on arms sales to China would strengthen their position.
While this case can be viewed on one level as a domestic dispute
between the legislative and executive branches, the fact that U.S.
policy on transatlantic arms production and sales is so fractured
and contentious hampers efforts to promote collaboration and is a
harbinger of continued confrontation in the short term.
Despite these formidable obstacles, signs are that a transatlantic
defense industrial base is feasible. General Electric announced in
November 2003 that it planned to buy a minority stake in Snecma,
once the French government launches its partial privatization
of the company.37 Still, acquisitions in the short term are likely to
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remain small. The main developments in transatlantic acquisitions
in 2003 were the acquisition of two European producers of aircraft
engines, FiatAvio and MTU Aero Engines, by U.S. companies (The
Carlyle Group and Kohlberg Kravis, respectively), and General
Dynamics’ acquisition of the Austrian producer of military vehicles,
Steyr Spezialfahrzeug.38 Most of the investment ﬂows have gone
from the United States to Europe. European acquisitions of U.S.based companies were much smaller deals, primarily by British
companies.39
The pattern in recent years often has been characterized by high
expectations of an impending union between key U.S. and European
defense ﬁrms that falls just short of consummation. General Dynamics
considered a merger with BAE Systems in 2003, as Boeing and
Lockheed Martin had previously.40 For BAE Systems, such a merger
would have allowed the company to expand its business with the
U.S. Government, where it already generates almost a quarter of its
revenues, and gain greater access to U.S. technologies. For General
Dynamics, a union with BAE Systems would ﬁll in its military
aerospace and shipbuilding businesses. However, the negotiations
broke down after BAE Systems refused to sell its proﬁtable and fastgrowing North American operations. This suggests the difﬁculty
that General Dynamics would have had to sell a full-blown merger
to U.S. Government ofﬁcials, who might be wary of technologies
slipping beyond their full control.
For U.S. ﬁrms looking for opportunities abroad, European
companies seeking to protect markets can be a bigger problem than
European politicians. General Dynamics boldly tried to acquire the
UK’s armored-vehicle maker, Alvis PLC, in early 2004.41 The U.S.
ﬁrm had received regulatory approval from the EU and Britain’s
Department of Trade and Industry. But in June, BAE Systems
offered to pay almost $100 million more than General Dynamics’s
$556 million bid, and the Alvis board withdrew its recommendation
to shareholders that they accept the General Dynamics bid. With
the Alvis acquisition, General Dynamics would have been one of
the top three armor vehicle makers in Europe, along with GIAT of
France and Germany’s Krauss-Maffei. For General Dynamics, the
acquisition was about a strategic plan to broaden the company’s
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global presence.42 Although in the end this case turned out to be
another example of national rather than transnational consolidation,
it is signiﬁcant that Nick Prest, Alvis chairman, could say that Alvis
executives briefed the Ministry of Defense of the likely General
Dynamics acquisition “as a matter of courtesy.” This is an indication
that ﬁrms―not governments―are calling many of the shots at this
stage of transatlantic dealmaking.
FUTURE SCENARIOS
Given the above summary of defense industry restructuring in
Europe and the United States, and the opportunities and obstacles
that this sector faces, it is possible to sketch scenarios for future
developments in the transatlantic defense industrial base.
Short-term (0-3 years).
The key factors that will affect developments in the near term
include the political and industrial decisions made by the UK; U.S.Europe relations during the second Bush administration; the GWOT;
and opportunities for further consolidation outside of defense
aerospace and electronics. Perhaps the most important factor will be
the decisions made by UK defense ﬁrms and their government. The
British government is the pivotal actor (some might say “mediator”)
in U.S.-Europe relations. The current government has been a
strong supporter of the United States in the GWOT and Iraq War,
and numerous reports suggest that Prime Minister Tony Blair and
President Bush share a close personal relationship. At the same time,
this UK Prime Minister is much more cooperative than any of his
predecessors in EU matters, with his backing of ESDP perhaps most
relevant to this discussion. In military procurement, the UK purchases
more from Thales than from any U.S. defense ﬁrm, and uses the
French company as a counterweight to its largest contractor―BAE
Systems. With his Labour Party very likely to win a third election in
May 2005, Prime Minister Blair and his cabinet colleagues may play
a decisive role in nudging the UK defense sector toward Europe or
the United States.
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British ﬁrms also will be key players in the near term. As
mentioned above, BAE Systems sells more to the U.S. Government
than any other non-U.S. company, which would make it a valuable
acquisition for a U.S. defense contractor. Yet, while the U.S. defense
market is extremely important to BAE Systems, so are the European
defense and civilian markets. With the recent ascent of Airbus in
the global aerospace industry, now surpassing Boeing in aircraft
orders and production, it would be extremely awkward for a U.S.
defense company to become a part of the consortium as a result of
acquiring BAE Systems (unless, of course, BAE’s stake in Airbus was
sold to EADS). Publicly, BAE Systems claims that it is not interested
in selling its North American business unit. Certainly, a U.S. ﬁrm
could make an offer that BAE Systems could not reasonably refuse,
but negotiations by Northrop Grumman and Boeing have yielded
no results, and the premium that BAE Systems would demand is too
costly for any U.S. company at this time.
By almost every account, U.S.-Europe relations have worsened
over the past 4 years. Shortly after his re-election, President Bush
announced that he would work during his second term to improve
transatlantic relations, beginning with a tour of Europe in early
2005.43 Certainly, European leaders (particularly France’s President
Jacques Chirac and Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder) also
must do their part if they wish to reverse the damage in U.S.-Europe
relations. However, it is difﬁcult to separate the defense dimension
of U.S.-Europe relations from the economic, political, and cultural
dimensions. Trade and economic disputes still play a central role in
the U.S.-EU link. On the political front, the U.S. and many European
governments disagree on policies toward Iraq, Iran, China, and Israel,
among other countries. And Robert Kagan’s quip that “Americans
are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus” contains more than
a grain of truth.44 Such a range of differences and disagreements
does not present an environment conducive to transatlantic defense
industrial mergers and acquisitions or collaboration on military
procurement between the United States and Europe on a bilateral
basis or even within NATO.
The third factor, the GWOT, will affect industrial restructuring
in two ways. First, the conduct of and results against the GWOT will
affect the U.S.-Europe relationship just described. A smooth transfer
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of authority in Iraq, the capture of leading international terrorists,
and a reduction of terrorist acts should enhance U.S. prestige and
improve transatlantic relations. As underscored by the March 2004
train bombings in Madrid, Spain, and the discovery of terrorist plots
in the UK, Europe is not immune from terrorism and has every
interest in the successful prosecution of the GWOT. However, poor
handling of these issues by the United States, at least in the perception
of Europeans, will accelerate ESDP and European initiatives to
handle military and counterterrorism activities on their own. The
Galileo satellite communications project may be a harbinger of more
European-based projects.
The second way in which the GWOT will affect defense industry
restructuring is in the types of products that defense ﬁrms will
develop. As shown in Table 1, three of the top ten U.S. defense
contractors (L-3 Communications, Computer Sciences Corp., and
Science Applications) are “nontraditional” defense ﬁrms, in the sense
that they produce intelligence, surveillance, and communications
products rather than planes, tanks, ships, or missiles. Also as
mentioned above, the budget for the Department of Homeland
Security presents opportunities for these nontraditional companies,
as well as for the likes of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.
One consequence of this trend is that more traditional defense ﬁrms
may seek to acquire these recent additions to the list of top defense
suppliers. Such acquisitions will almost certainly be among U.S.
ﬁrms or among European companies, since it is hard to imagine
U.S. ofﬁcials approving European purchases of U.S. ﬁrms while this
sector is still regarded as important to nurture while conducting the
GWOT.
The ﬁnal factor that will inﬂuence short-term restructuring is the
condition of ﬁrms producing primarily land vehicles and naval ships.
This is less of a problem in the United States than it is in Europe,
where further consolidation among or between French and German
companies in particular would make ﬁnancial and industrial (if not
political) sense. In the United States, two naval shipbuilders operate
six yards, while Europe has 21 ﬁrms with 23 yards.45 Whereas U.S.
defense ﬁrms have made a fair number of acquisitions in Europe in
these particular sectors, European governments likely have reached
the limits in their willingness to allow this trend to continue. In
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October 2004, two of Germany’s biggest shipbuilders, Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) and ThyssenKrupp, merged their
assets. The next logical step would be a merger with France’s DCN,
although some in the French government would like to include
Thales in the mix―an addition that the Germans feel would give
the resultant company too much of a French orientation.46 Given the
strong hand that the French government has to inﬂuence this sector,
it would be virtually impossible for shipbuilders to consolidate on
their own accord. Other than land vehicles and shipbuilding, there
likely will be few instances of defense mergers and acquisitions. One
exception may be Saab. BAE Systems announced in December 2004
that it planned to sell 10 percent of its 35 percent stake in Sweden’s
largest defense company.47 This may present an opportunity for
EADS or for a U.S. defense or specialty ﬁrm (like The Carlyle Group)
to take over all of BAE Systems’ interests in Saab.
To sum up, in the near term, we can expect further consolidation
among European producers of land vehicles and naval ships (once
agreement is reached between national governments), and an
increased prominence of nontraditional defense ﬁrms on both sides
of the Atlantic. Mergers among the largest defense ﬁrms essentially
will depend on the direction chosen by UK politicians and business
leaders. U.S.-Europe relations, broadly deﬁned, will determine
whether these sectoral changes will be transatlantic or bipolar in
nature.
Medium-term (4-10 years).
In the medium term, we are likely to see fairly signiﬁcant
developments in the transatlantic defense industrial base. Five
factors will play important roles. The ﬁrst is a change in military
equipment procurement, which will affect industrial developments
in at least three ways. Unless the United States and Europe experience
a horriﬁc terrorist act, it is likely that defense spending will level out
or even decline. As discussed above, Europe’s defense spending is
far below levels at the end of the Cold War and, short of a series of
terrorist acts in European cities, it is unlikely that it will rise much
in most countries. The implication for European defense ﬁrms is
that further consolidation may be the best bet for cutting costs and
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increasing competition. A second aspect of procurement changes is
an emphasis on systems integration rather than weapons platforms.48
This trend started with the Pentagon, but has now been adopted by
the Europeans, too. A company that can integrate systems that link
ships, aircraft, tanks, and satellites into a seamless network will have
an edge in winning contracts, as Thales has discovered. A third aspect
of procurement is an even greater pressure to “buy domestic.” In
the current political environment, it is hard to envision the Pentagon
purchasing any signiﬁcant amount of weapons systems from nonU.S. suppliers (BAE Systems excepted for reasons already discussed).
The EU-15 countries dramatically have cut their purchases of U.S.
weapons in recent years (see Table 4). These countries bought $1.4
billion in arms from the United States in 2003, down from $3.5 billion
in 2000. Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU
in 2004, particularly Poland, have a greater export potential for U.S.
defense companies. However, even this market may prove difﬁcult
if EU membership, and the obligations and policy harmonization
that accompanies it, results in “New Europe” becoming more like
“Old Europe.”49 At the same time, the share of the international arms
market held by U.S. ﬁrms has shrunk from 47 percent in 1999 to
under 24 percent in 2003 (see Table 5). Given the decline in European
and global purchases of U.S.-made weapons, the U.S. Government
is going to be very reluctant to increase its spending on Europeanmade equipment.
Second, within a decade it should be clear whether ESDP and
other EU-initiated defense and defense industrial policies will
amount to anything substantial. It will be an immense challenge
for an institution of 25 members to reach agreement on important
foreign, security, and defense policy matters, let alone whether and
how military force should be used. It will require a political will that
the EU could not muster in the Iraq War to address many of the
challenges in the medium-term future (GWOT, relations with Russia
and China, and regional stability in North Africa and the Middle
East, to name a few). The opportunities on the defense economics
front appear more manageable, but by no means assured. One of
the next big steps that the EU could take in achieving a truly single
economic market would be to apply such liberalizing principles to
the market for defense equipment. EU treaties currently exempt arms
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RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

FY2000

FY2001

FY2002

FY2003

Austria

8,036

15,271

4,923

5,703

Belgium

36,739

85,732

48,580

68,358

Denmark

15,496

47,200

94,980

22,734

Finland

12,535

89,215

7,216

4,950

France

84,580

268,878

229,626

45,598

Germany

295,329

93,982

161,365

319,314

Greece

2,080,834

809,797

335,514

54,128

Ireland

-

4

9

12,510

Italy

160,300

805,387

168,158

154,119

Luxembourg

345

573

2,823

2,037

Netherlands

420,630

263,099

156,047

97,969

Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
TOTAL EU-15
Czech Republic
Hungary

5,795

20,383

160,843

7,908

92,369

65,439

122,966

119,889

4,366

3,232

6,731

2,090

328,345

678,009

247,146

464,913

3,545,699

3,246,201

1,746,927

1,382,220

11,073

9,581

20,544

8,805

6,772

3,197

12,797

5,365

Poland

20,549

27,974

65,489

3,570,226

Turkey

386,191

141,567

205,868

440,042

Note: Figures are in U.S.$ thousand and represent foreign military sales agreements.
Source: Figures derived from Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.osd.
mil/programs/biz-ops/2003_facts/Facts_Book_2003_Oct04_FINAL.pdf.

Table 4. U.S. Arms Sales to Selected European Countries.
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SUPPLIER

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

19992003

United States

9,977

6,071

4,887

4,279

4,385

29,599

Russia

3,731

4,003

5,521

5,963

6,980

26,198

France

1,457

743

1,095

1,324

1,753

6,372

Germany

1,282

1,261

575

573

1,549

5,240

United Kingdom

967

1,105

968

639

525

4,204

Ukraine

770

327

631

233

234

2,195

Italy

426

174

260

511

277

1,648

China

207

160

347

410

404

1,528

Netherlands

318

195

188

257

268

1,226

Canada

130

102

80

316

556

1,184

World Total

21,257

15,549

16,611

16,143

18,680

88,240

US % of Total

46.9%

39.0%

29.4%

26.5%

23.5%

33.5%

Note: Figures are in U.S.$ million at constant (1990) prices.
Source: Figures derived from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/app12A2004.pdf.

Table 5. International Arms Sales: Top Ten Suppliers of Major
Conventional Weapons (1999-2003).
production and procurement from EU rules, such as antitrust and
open procurement policies. While the EDA and OCCAR described
above may go some way toward opening weapons procurement,
treaty revisions would be the best way to forge a single market
for defense-related material. The pursuit of such political and
economic policies discussed here face huge obstacles from mostly
large European countries (particularly France and the UK) that still
cling to the notion that preserving an indigenous defense industry
is essential for national security. Until this concern is ameliorated by
greater political integration, including an ESDP that the rest of the
world takes seriously, countries like France, Germany, and the UK
will continue to swim against the tide of market forces and corporate
decisionmaking.
Third, U.S.-Europe relations will again play a prominent role.
While we do not know what the geopolitical and geoeconomic context
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of the medium term will be, we can surmise the issues that will
shape it. They include the evolution of the GWOT; developments in
Europe’s “near abroad,” which would include the countries bordering
Europe to the east (particularly Russia) and in northern Africa and
the Middle East; the addition to the EU of new members, including
Turkey; the rise of new economic powers such as China and India; the
trade and ﬁnancial inﬂuence of the United States and EU, including
the global acceptance of the Euro; and the ability to address social
issues, such as immigration and aging populations. Most of these
issues have the potential to drive a wedge in transatlantic relations
or, just as bad, lead to more inward-looking or unilateral policies. It
follows, then, that if these issues push Europe and the United States
to work together to resolve them, the transatlantic defense industrial
base will beneﬁt. On the other hand, if they serve to further political
estrangement, we can expect the completion of a bipolar defense
industry.
Finally, the economics of sectoral consolidation will continue
to play themselves out. While political obstacles will no doubt
continue to slow European defense industrial consolidation from
a more market-oriented approach, it would be difﬁcult to believe
that the status quo would remain unchanged 5-10 years from now.
Consolidation in naval shipbuilding will be slow and messy, but
almost certainly will happen. The same is true for the tank, armored
vehicle, and other land armaments companies. The largest piece of
the transformation puzzle again may come down to the British and
BAE Systems. Its access to the Pentagon makes it attractive to U.S.
suitors, as well as to EADS. However, a merger between BAE Systems
and EADS could “kill the goose that lays the golden eggs,” if the
U.S. Government then deems the combined entity not trustworthy
enough for the most sophisticated (and proﬁtable) technologies.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above summary and analysis, we propose the
following recommendations, which are based on the assumption
that a transatlantic defense industrial base is preferable to a bipolar
one, and that it should be strengthened.
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U.S. Government.
Europeans often have complained that the transatlantic arms
trade is not a “two-way street,” and in recent years have taken
steps to obstruct incoming trafﬁc. This is not in U.S. interests. For
this reason, and the equally important recognition that relying on
competition among indigenous ﬁrms has signiﬁcant limitations, the
U.S. Government should open its defense market to more European
ﬁrms, while simultaneously encouraging and pressuring (and
negotiating with, if necessary) European governments to do likewise.
One step likely to yield considerable beneﬁts for the United States
and its defense ﬁrms is to persuade the EU to implement legislation
that would apply the beneﬁts corresponding to the current single
market in civilian goods and services to the market for defense
material. The U.S. Government also should seek to enhance the
contract-awarding and procurement-coordinating authority of
NATO, with the objective of promoting transatlantic collaboration
at the industrial and procurement levels.
U.S. Military.
The U.S. armed services need to work more closely with their
European counterparts, either bilaterally or through NATO, to
coordinate procurement requirements and needs. This may be difﬁcult
if ESDP becomes so successful as to undermine NATO. However,
the beneﬁts are two-fold. First, it will improve the interoperability
of U.S. and European military forces, thereby reducing the ﬁnancial,
human, and other costs associated with the deployment of troops.
Second, it will reduce the cost of weapons systems. This will become
an even more important consideration when U.S. defense spending
levels off, as is becoming increasingly likely.
U.S. Defense Companies.
U.S. defense ﬁrms should continue to explore opportunities in
Europe on two levels. The ﬁrst is for possible acquisition targets,
with the understanding that there may be considerable reluctance
and opposition on the part of European business, government,
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and society. The second strategy would be to subcontract more
technologically sensitive production to European defense companies.
This will require persuading U.S. Government ofﬁcials that European
companies and countries can be trusted with such technologies, but
may result in a change in perceptions of European defense ministries,
who may then be more willing to “Buy American”―an action that
many European governments have been less willing to do in recent
years.
Conclusions.
Promoting transatlantic defense industry links is not a panacea
for the larger issue of establishing a defense industrial base that
can develop new technologies and sell them to the Pentagon and
European defense ministries at competitive prices. That can in all
likelihood be achieved more easily by opening procurement to all
bidders. That means persuading the Pentagon (and Congress) to
award more contracts to European ﬁrms. It also means giving the EU’s
EDA real responsibilities and decisionmaking powers in procuring
weapons systems for member states―a move which would curb the
dirigiste traditions of certain governments. Such recommendations
will face signiﬁcant opposition on both sides of the Atlantic.
A possible problem for U.S. defense ﬁrms is that Bush
administration foreign policy actions have caused anti-American
sentiment in some markets. In Europe, countries that opposed the
Iraq War will very likely opt for European-produced weapons
systems over U.S. products whenever possible. U.S. laws that already
strongly favor domestic defense ﬁrms now are being used by U.S.
companies to fend off foreign competition.50 Sikorsky employed
such a strategy in its competition with Augusta-Westland to replace
the President’s ﬂeet of helicopters. Although Sikorsky’s strategy
proved unsuccessful, such tactics could prove risky if European
governments retaliate by limiting purchases of U.S. defense exports.
On the other hand, Control Risks, a UK-based international security
consultancy, claims that U.S. defense companies were important
business winners in 2003 due to the success of their products during
the ﬁrst month of the Iraq War.51 The lesson here is that, despite the
superiority of many U.S. military items, politics may trump sound
economics.
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Within the EU, a growing chorus of voices is calling for a single,
competitive market in armaments that is treated in much the same
way as other economic sectors. As the European Commission
succinctly put it, “[T]he survival of a European defence industrial
base able to support the ESDP will depend on successful national
and trans-European consolidation of the industry as well as
transatlantic partnerships between companies.”52 But it will be the
intergovernmental Council―not the supranational Commission―
that will have the ﬁnal word on this subject, particularly on how
ESDP will shape the EU’s relationship with NATO.
At the national level, key European governments remain
relatively hostile to acquisitions by U.S. ﬁrms. For example, the
German government opposes takeovers of German military vehicles’
producers by U.S. companies.53 The 2002 acquisition of the German
shipyard HDW by One Equity Partners (OEP), a U.S. institutional
investor, led to fears of a sellout of the German arms industry. These
fears were ameliorated somewhat in 2004, when HDW was merged
with the shipyards of Thyssen Krupp, with OEP’s stake reduced
to 25 percent. In France, partial ownership by the state and trusted
shareholders (noyau dur) of defense companies makes acquisitions
by U.S. ﬁrms virtually impossible. Consequently, such concerns―on
both sides of the Atlantic―will be difﬁcult to overcome in the nearterm.
NATO’s position in this issue is ambiguous. Currently, the
alliance plays a relatively minor role in shaping the transatlantic
defense industrial base. Occasionally, NATO is responsible for
awarding contracts, as it did in April 2004 when it awarded its largest
defense contract in decades, a multi-billion euro ﬂeet of surveillance
aircraft, to a consortium led by EADS and that included Northrop
Grumman.54 But for the most part, NATO can do little at the moment
to shape corporate restructuring, except indirectly by, for example,
setting weapons performance goals and interoperability standards.
The more important question is whether NATO and the EU will
conﬂict with each other over institutional mission and responsibility.
At a summit in London in November 2003, Prime Minister Blair and
President Chirac said a European defense policy with its own military
capability was perfectly compatible with NATO.55 The concern
that many U.S. policymakers have is whether an EU operational
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command cell would duplicate NATO structures. Not only would
this be a waste of the already limited budgets of European defense
ministries, but it also would affect negatively NATO’s capabilities.
In any case, the outcome ultimately will depend mostly on
Europe. European efforts to develop a common defense policy will
have a large impact on how that region’s industry develops. If EDA
is successful, for example, in procuring common weapons systems
from European arms producers, it will be difﬁcult to break the
bipolar orientation of the transatlantic defense sector. In fact, it could
even put the capabilities of Europe’s defense ﬁrms on a par with the
U.S. industrial base. But if the EU fails to build any substance into
ESDP, and a membership of 25 countries will most certainly make
this increasingly difﬁcult, then the chances are good that European
defense ﬁrms will, one by one, look to U.S. companies to help build
their future.
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